Abstract. A multivariate public key cryptosystem (MPKCs for short) have a set of (usually) quadratic polynomials over a nite eld as its public map. Its main security assumption is backed by the NP-hardness of the problem to solve nonlinear equations over a nite eld. This family is considered as one of the major families of PKCs that could resist potentially even the powerful quantum computers of the future. There has been fast and intensive development in Multivariate Public Key Cryptography in the last two decades. Some constructions are not as secure as was claimed initially, but others are still viable. The paper gives an overview of multivariate public key cryptography and discusses the current status of the research in this area.
Introduction
As envisioned by Die and Hellman, a public key cryptosystem (hereafter PKC for short) depends on the existence of class of trapdoor one-way functions. This class and the mathematical structure behind it will determine all the essential characteristics of the PKC. So for example behind elliptic cryptography is the elliptic curve group, and behind NTRU stands the structure of an integral lattice.
Multivariate (Public-Key) Cryptography is the study of PKCs where the trapdoor one-way function takes the form of a multivariate quadratic polynomial map over a nite eld. Namely the public key is in general given by a set of quadratic polynomials: P = (p 1 (w 1 , . . . , w n ), . . . , p m (w 1 , . . . , w n )), where each p i is a (usu. quadratic) nonlinear polynomial in w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ):
with all coecients and variables in K = F q , the eld with q elements. The evaluation of these polynomials at any given value corresponds to either the encryption procedure or the verication procedure. Such PKCs are called multivariate public key cryptosystems (hereafter MPKCs). Inverting a multivariate quadratic map is equivalent to solving a set of quadratic equations over a nite eld, or the following problem:
Problem MQ: Solve the system p 1 (x) = p 2 (x) = · · · = p m (x) = 0, where each p i is a quadratic in x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). All coecients and variables are in K = F q , the eld with q elements.
MQ is in general an NP-hard problem. Such problems are believed to be hard unless the class P is equal to N P . Of course, a random set of quadratic equations would not have a trapdoor and hence not be usable in an MPKC. The corresponding mathematical structure to a system of polynomial equations, not necessarily generic, is the ideal generated by those polynomials. So, philosophically speaking, multivariate cryptography relate to mathematics that handles polynomial ideals, namely algebraic geometry.
In contrast, the security of RSA-type cryptosystems relies on the complex- Since we are no longer dealing with random or generic systems, but systems where specic trapdoors exist, the security MPKCs is then not guaranteed by the NP-hardness of MQ, and eective attacks may exist for any chosen trapdoor. The history of MPKCs therefore evolves as we understand more and more about how to design secure multivariate trapdoors.
Sec. 2 is a sketch of how MPKCs work in general. Sec. 3 gives examples of current MPKCs. Sec. 4 describes the known trapdoor constructions in somewhat more detail. Sec. 5 describes the most important mode of attacks. The last section will be a short discussion about future development.
The Basics of Multivariate PKCs
After Die-Hellman [28] , cryptolographers proposed many trapdoor functions.
Most of these were forgotten and RSA became dominant. The earliest published proposals of MPKCs scheme by Shigeo Tsujii and Hideki Imai, seemed to have arisen around this time. They are independently known to have worked on this topic in the early 1980s. Certainly lectures are given on this topic no later than 1983. However, for several years, their work were not published in anything other than Japanese, and remained largely unknown outside Japan.
As far as we know, the rst article written in English describing a PKC with more than one independent variable may be the one from Ong et al [78] , and the rst use of more than one equation is by Fell and Die [52] . The earliest attempt bearing some resemblance to today's MPKCs (with 4 variables) seems to be [71] . In 1988, the rst MPKC in the modern form appears [70] . It seems as if basic construction described below (cf. Sec. 2.1) has not changed for 20 years.
The Standard (Bipolar) Construction and Notations
Even if we restrict ourselves to cryptosystems for which the public key is a set of polynomials P = (p 1 , . . . , p m ) in variables w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) where all variables and coecients are in K = F q , the way to hide the trapdoor is not unique.
However, extant MPKCs almost always hide the private map Q via composition with two ane maps S, T . So, P = T • Q • S : K n → K 
In any given scheme, the central map Q belongs to a certain class of quadratic maps whose inverse can be computed relatively easily. The maps S, T are ane (sometimes linear) and full-rank. The x j are called the central variables. The polynomials giving y i in x are called the central polynomials; when necessary to distinguish between the variable and the value, we will write y i = q i (x). The key of a MPKC is the design of the central map.
The public key consists of the polynomials in P. In practice, this is always the collection of the coecients of the p i 's, compiled in some order conducive to easy computation. Since we are doing public-key cryptography, P(0) is always taken to be zero, hence public polynomials do not have constant terms.
The secret key consists of the informations in S, T , and Q. That is, we collect (M T , c T ) and whatever parameters there exist in Q. In theory one of c S and c T is extraneous but we keep it anyway.
To verify a signature or to encrypt a block, one simply computes z = P(w). To sign or to decrypt a block, one computes y = T −1 (z), x = Q −1 (y) and w = S −1 (x) in turn. Notice that these may be only one of the many pre-images, not necessarily an inverse function in the strict sense of the word.
We summarize the notations used in Table 1 and will henceforth use it consistently to make our exposition easier to understand. And we summarize operating details below so that the reader will have some basic sense of about how these schemes can be applied practically.
Cipher block or Message digest Size: m elements of F q Plaintext block or Signature Size: n elements of F q Public Key Size: mn(n + 3)/2 F q -elements, often stored in log-form We immediately see the major disadvantage with MPKCs: Their keys are very large compared to traditional systems like RSA or ECC. For example, the public key size of RSA-2048 is not much more than 2048 bits, but a current version of the Rainbow signature scheme has n = 42, m = 24, q = 256, i.e., 
Other Constructions
It should be noted that MPKCs are also sometimes called trapdoor MQ schemes for a reason, all the construction currently used do quadratic public keys for speed reasons with higher order terms, the explosion in number of coecients oset any possible gain in eciency. Furthermore, in the bipolar form, higherorder terms may in fact hurt the security.
Here we cover two alternatives in which multivariate polynomials can be used for PKCs. These are called the Implicit Form and Isomorphisms of Polynomials. Implicit Form MPKCs The public key is a system of l equations (3) where each p i is a polynomial in w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) and z = (z 1 , . . . , z m ). This P is built from the secret Q
For any given specic element x , we can easily solve the equation Q(x , y) = (0, . . . , 0); (4) for any given specic element y , we can easily solve the equation
(usu.) Eq. 4 is linear and Eq. 5 is nonlinear but specialized to be solvable. Now, we can build
where S, T are invertible ane maps and L is linear. To verify a signature w with the digest z, one checks that P(w, z) = 0. If we want to use P to encrypt the plaintext w, we would solve P(w, z) = (0, . . . , 0), and nd the ciphertext z. To invert (i.e., to decrypt or more likely to sign) z, one rst calculates y = T −1 (z), then plugs y into the equation (5) and solve for x. The result plaintext or signature is given by w = S −1 (x).
To recap, in an implicit-form MPKC, the public key consists of the l polynomial components of P and the eld structure of k. The secret key mainly consists of L, S and T . Depending on the case the equation Q(X, Y ) = (0, . . . , 0) is either known or has parameters that is a part of the secret key. Again the basic idea is that S, T , L serve the purpose to hide the equation Q(x, y) = 0, which otherwise could be easily solved for any y. Mixed schemes are relatively rare, one example being Patarin's Dragon [82] .
Isomorphism of Polynomials The IP problem originated by trying to attack MPKCs by nding the secret keys. LetF 1 ,F 2 with (6) be two polynomial maps from K n to K 
It is clear that this problem is closely related to the attack of nding private keys for a MPKC, for example the Matsumoto-Imai cryptosystems, and was rst proposed by Patarin [83] , where the verication process is performed through showing the equivalence (or isomorphism) of two dierent maps. A simplied version is called the isomorphism of polynomials with one secret (IP1s) problem, where we only need to nd the map S (if it exists), while the map T is known to be the identity map. More later in this direction are [51, 57, 68, 86, 87] .
Examples of Multivariate PKCs
In this section, we bring to you three curent MPKCs; each with special properties, advantages and disadvantages. We don't try to discuss their security in this section that will be left until the next section. We characterize a Rainbow [40] type PKC with u stages:
The segment structure is given by a sequence 0
. , y n = q n (x) notice unusual indexing of the following form
In every q k , where k ∈ O l , there is no cross-term x i x j where both i and j are in O l at all. So given all the y i with v l < i ≤ v l+1 , and all the x j with j ≤ v l , we can compute
To expedite computations, some coecients (α (k) ij ) may be xed (e.g., set to zero), chosen at random (and included in the private key), or be interrelated in a predetermined manner.
To invert Q, determine (usu. at random) x 1 , . . . We may always represent the eld F q n as an n-dimensional vector space over
, where P is any irreducible polynomial of degree n. Once we select P , we will then hereafter identify F q n with (F q )
q is then a linear transformation. We thus know that a map g :
and only if gcd(q α + 1, q n − 1) = 1, then this map is invertible. In fact we can nd an h such that g −1 (y) = (y) h . This g will be termed C * q,n,α , where the parameters may be omitted if context permits. We also write its components as
That is the central map of C * or Matsumoto-Imai itself.
For Perturbed Matsumoto-Imai Plus we both perturb and add polynomials.
That is, we set q = 2 (to make guessing easier later) and choose v = (v 1 , . . . , v r ), a collection of r linear forms in x, and f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), a random n-tuple of quadratic functions in v. Further take g = (g 1 , . . . , g a ) be an a-tuple of random quadratic functions of x. We dene Q := (C * + f (v)) g. That is, Q is a map from F 2 n to F 2 n+a whose components are given by
How do invert Q? That is, if y = Q(x), how would we then nd x? First, we toss out the last a components, and randomly guess at the perturbation term v(x).
That is, let h is the exponent that can be used to invert C * . If y is the rst n components of y, for all possible b ∈ F 2 r we compute x = (y − b)
h and check to see whether v(x) = b. Since inverting C * is relatively slow, we can say that the perturbation made it 2 r times slower to decrypt than the corresponding C * .
The last a components can also ensure the correctness of the ciphertext.
It remains to give the system some concrete parameters. At the moment, our choices are as in [33] : (n, r, a, α) = (136, 6, 18, 8) . The public key size is n(n + 1)(n + a)/2 bits or 167688 bytes; the secret key is (n + a) 2 + n 2 + nr(r + 3)/2 + an(n + 1)/2 bits or 26324 bytes. Design security is 2 83 . 3.3 The Quartz or HFEv-(2, 129, 103, 3, 4) Signature Scheme An immediate extension of the C * concept is Hidden Field Equations, introduced by Patarin [83] . In place of the C * polynomial, we would substitute this : 
The public key of the Quartz signature scheme uses q = 2, n = 103, dimension 4 for thex subspace, and furthermore uses the minus variant by removing three polynomials from the public key. So there are 107 variables and 100 equations.
The actual verication procedure in Quartz is even more complex [21] , involving using the public map four times to avoid birthday attacks, since the design goal is a short signature (here 128 bits) and not speed. Despite this detail, the ability to solve such system still enables one to forge a signature.
The secret key of Quartz is 3kB, the public key size is (100 × 107 × 108/2) bits = 71kB. Design security is 2
Some Computational Aspects of MPKCs
Many computations of MPKCs will be conducted in K = F q . Often q is a small power of 2 so that each element in K can be stored in a byte and addition represented by bitwise exclusive-or. To multiply, normally one choose a generator g in K such that all non-zero x can be written as x = g i (this i is also denoted log g x).
We build logarithm and exponential tables and evaluate multiplications between non-zero x and y as g (log g x+log g y)
. Operations in an extension L = F n q as vectors over K = F q is frequent (e.g., in big-eld MPKCs). A product in L is like multiplying two degree < n polynomials over F q . Using schoolbook multiplication and then reducing the terms with degree ≥ n takes at most 2n 2 multiplications. A more advanced method like Karatsuba takes less time. A division is a little slower than a multiplication.
It is also not a trivial issue to build keys for an MPKC. The classical way to compute the keys is interpolation [70] . In general, one select M S , c S , M T plus whatever parameters in Q, if any. We can set
which makes all the constant terms zero. Now we can evaluate P(w) = T • Q • S(w) for any w. Write the Matsumoto-Imai form public key (Eq. 1) as:
In F 2 , x 2 = x for any x, so there is no Q ik term. One also note that to evaluate the public key one need to do one F q multiplication per element of the public key. Let b i ∈ F n q be the unit vector in the i-th axis, and for q > 2, we choose any a = 0, 1 and get Let's demonstrate this for a C * based scheme where the rate-determining mechanism is the evaluation of C * : 
Basic Constructions and Variations
MPKCs are built in many ways. We aim to give you the major types of constructions, maybe accent some important associated algebraic characteristics (like this), and common variations thereof. A summary of variants is given in Table 3 .
Historical Constructions
The rst attempt to construct a multivariate signature [78, 79] is based on a quadratic equation
where n = pq is an RSA modulus, the product of two large primes. To sign a message y, we need to nd one of the many (about n) solutions (x 1 , x 2 ) to Eq. 11, which is easy if we know the factorization of n. The public key is essentially the integer n and Eq. 11. Since the security relies on the factorization of n, this system is really a derivative of RSA, though it indeed initiated the idea of multivariate cryptosystems. This system was broken by Pollard and Schnorr in [89] , where they found a probabilistic algorithm to solve Eq. 11 for any y without knowing the factors of n. Assuming the generalized Riemann hypothesis, a solution can be found with a time complexity of O((log n) 2 log log |k|) in O(log n)-bit integer operations.
The idea of Die and Fell [52] was to build a cryptosystems using the composition of invertible linear maps and simple tame maps of the form T (x 1 , x 2 ) = (x 1 + g(x 2 ), x 2 ), where g is a polynomial.
Tame maps are easily invertible and hard to unscramble when composed with each other, however [52] used only two variables and equations; not surprisingly, the authors concluded that it appeared very dicult to build such a cryptosystem with practical value that is both secure and has a public key of practical size.
An attempt to build a true multivariate (with four variables) public key cryptosystem were also made by Matsumoto, Imai, Harashima and Miyagawa [71] , where the public keys are given by quadratic polynomials. However it was soon defeated [77] . People soon realized that more than 4 variables are needed.
Triangular Constructions
Of course, the tame maps used in [52] are a special case of the triangular or de Jonquières maps from algebraic geometry, which are more generally dened by: (12) where the g i are arbitrary polynomial functions. We note that J can be easily inverted assuming that the g i are known. The invertible ane linear maps over k [93] claims to prove that the Nagata map is wild.
The rst attempt in the English literature with a clear triangular form is the Birational Permutations construction by Shamir [92] . However, triangular constructions were earlier pursued unsuccessfully in Japan under the name sequential solution type systems [61, 96, 97] . Their construction is actually even more general in the sense that they use rational functions instead of just polynomial.
These works are not so well-known, partially because they were in Japanese.
Triangular maps are lightning fast to evaluate and to invert. However, they do have another denitive characteristic, an algebraic one, that must be accounted for. On the small end of a triangular system, so to speak, a variable is mapped to some simple function of itself. On the bigger end, one variable appears in a single equation only. The other equations involve successively more variables.
In other words, let us write the quadratic portion of the central polynomials y i = q i (x) as bilinear forms, or take the symmetric matrix denoting the symmetric dierential of the central polynomials as in
then rank M i increases monotonically as i increases. In fact, if q = 2 k , the equation dealing with x 1 always has rank zero. Furthermore, ker M 1 ⊂ ker M 2 · · · . This is the chain of kernels as pointed out by Coppersmith et al [18] .
This rank and chain relation is invariant under invertible map S. That is, consider y i as a function of w, the corresponding dierential is b
This leads to what is known as rank attacks based on linear algebra [18, 58] . Therefore triangular/tame constructions can't be used alone. Some ways to design around this problem are lock polynomials (Sec. 4.6) , solvable segments (Sec. 4.4 ) and plus-minus (Sec. 4.5 
then, one hide this map Q by composing from both sides by two invertible ane linear maps S and T in K n , as in Eq. 2.
Now we briey recap how C * is dened earlier (cf. Sec. 3 
.2). Matsumoto and
Imai suggest that we pick a K of characteristic 2 and this map Q
where x is an element in L, and such that gcd(1 + q α , q n − 1) = 1. The last condition ensures that the map Q has an inverse, which is given by
where h(1 + q α ) = 1 mod (q n − 1). This ensures that we can decrypt any secret message easily by this inverse. For the rest of this chapter, we will simply identify a vector space K k with larger eld L, and Q with Q, totally omitting the isomorphism φ from formulas. When necessary to distinguish the inner product in a vector space over K and the larger eld L, the former will be denoted by a dot (·) and the latter an asterisk ( * ). One more important thing is that the map Q is always quadratic due to the linearity of the Frobenius map
A signicant algebraic implication of C * and Eq. 15 is y
y. (17) This enabled Jacques Patarin [81] to cryptanalyze the original C * with his bilinear relations (see Sec. 5.1) . Though the original idea of C * failed, it has inspired many new designs, mostly from Patarin and his collaborators (cf. Secs. 4 
.5 and 4.8).
The most signicant of the C * derivatives is likely HFE (Hidden Field Equations). As mentioned in Sec. 3.3 , instead of using for Q the monomial used by C * , we would substitute the extended Dembowski-Ostrom polynomial map:
This map is in general not one-to-one; some kind of checksum is required to identify the inverse from one of a number of possible candidates. Inverting Q is equivalent to solving a univariate equation of high degree in L. A key fact is that the intrinsic rank of the map is bounded by r, and usually achieves that value for randomly chosen parameters. This rank is very closely related to the complexity of current attacks [23, 50] . For example, the HFE Challenge 1 solved by Faugère and Joux [50] has an intrinsic rank of 4.
HFE with a high d is unbroken, although it can be really slow to decrypt/invert.
Quartz probably set a record for the slowest cryptographical algorithm when submitted to NESSIE on a Pentium III 500MHz, it took half a minute to do a signature [since improved to 10s with better programming].
Finally, C * and HFE each can be modied by techniques mentioned elsewhere (Plus-Minus, vinegar variables, and internal perturbation). Also related are the IC system (Sec. 4.7) and probabilistic big-eld based MPKCs [59] . One can safely say that all in all, C * really spawned a lot of useful research.
Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar and Derivatives
The Oil and Vinegar and later derived unbalance Oil and Vinegar schemes [64, 80] are suitable for signatures. This construction is inspired by the idea of linearization equations (cf. Sec. 4.3) . Suppose v < n is an integer and m = o = n − v. The variables x 1 , . . . , x v are termed vinegar variables and x v+1 , . . . , x n oil variables. Take a map Q : Given a message y = (y 1 , . . . , y o ), in order to sign it, one needs to try to nd a vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ) such that P(w) = y. With the secret key it can be done easily. What algebraic property is most signicant in an unbalanced Oil-and-Vinegar system? No doubt the lack of pure oil cross-terms. Equivalently, if we have an UOV structure, then the quadratic part of each component q i in the central map from x to y, when expressed as a symmetric matrix (cf. Eq. 13), looks like
We should mention the fact that there are many equivalent keys [103] . Computing the essential part of secret keys is part of the attack of Sec. 5 
Starting from a random choice of initial vinegar variables x 1 , . . . , x v 1 , one solve for more x i 's in sets of equations until we have all the x i 's. Note that the components of y in a Rainbow-type construction is typically written to have indices v 1 + 1, . . . , n. In the pure Rainbow scheme, S and T and the coecients α and β are totally randomly chosen. The essential structure of the Rainbow instance is determined by 0
What is the main algebraic property of an UOV stage? First and foremost is that it is of course, a special case of UOV; however, the form of leads to a dierent attack of which the reader will be appraised later in Sec. 5.5 .
Aside from attacks peculiar to UOV and Rainbow, the Rainbow-type constructions also share enough characteristics of triangular schemes, that there is the need to account for rank-based attacks (Sec. 5.4) , such as the two improved attacks in [9, 45] . At the moment, none of these attacks are considered essential. As one might well guess, Plus-Minus alone does not make triangular constructions safe. Indeed, [58] discuss this in detail and concludes exactly the opposite: Triangle-Plus-Minus constructions can be broken by very straightforward attacks using simple linear algebra. Some more elaborate possibilities [9, 45, 108] are discussed in the following sections.
TTM and Related Schemes: Lock or Repeated Triangular
PKC's based on just triangular constructions were not pursued again until a much more complex defense against rank attacks was proposed, with the tame transformation method (TTM) of Tsong-Tsieng Moh [72] .
One can see that de Jonquières maps can be upper triangular as well as lower triangular. In fact, you can arrange the indices any which way you want.
Moh [72] suggested a construction where the central map Q is given by The multiplitude of central polynomials of low rank present in published TTM instances [15, 72, 74] is the main source of known attacks. [74, Appendix II] gives you an idea of the polynomials of a TTM instance can look like. Although the TTM construction is original and very intriguing, so far existing constructions of the TTM cryptosystem and related schemes do not work for public-key encryption. In fact, most of the schemes proposed are not presented in any systematic way, and no explanation is given why and how they work. We can tell you a little about why some of these fail, however, in Secs. 5.1 and 5. 4. More sophistication is needed and we suspect that to create a successful TTMlike scheme may require deep insight from algebraic geometry. 4 and IC ( -Invertible Cycles) we describe below. Both these schemes also happen to share a characteristic: the use a standard Cremona transform in algebraic geometry, where L * := L\{0} for some eld L:
This is a bijection for any eld L, and inverts via
Here
2 and for i = 3 · · · 3k, q i is a more or less a random quadratic in variables (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ). 
The rst step to inverting Q comes from Eq. 24 via simple linear algebra:
and similarly,
Thus, knowing Y 4 , . . . , Y 15 , we can nd det A 1 , det A 2 , and det A 3 , provided that none of them is zero (we will need to take square roots in L). Furthermore,
Therefore, having found det A 1 , det A 2 , det A 3 , we reduce the components of Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 to a triangular form in the x i :
then we apply a second triangular step to compute X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 component by component. If X 1 = 0, from det A 1 we can also nd X 4 and complete the inversion. [101] has details on how to handle X 1 = 0. Of course, cases where one of the det A i is 0 result in a decryption failure.
The main algebraic property of MFE is the central round of three matrix products. Today, everyone knows to defend against linearization relations, and MFE did in fact achieve this when they put A 
For standard 3IC,
3 is then easy.
This is 10× faster computationally than the inverse of C * . Aside from that, analysis of the properties of the 3IC map can be found in [43] the 3IC and C * maps has so much in common that the former can almost be viewed as a turbocharged version of the latter especially when looking at signature schemes.
For encryption schemes, 2IC or = 2, q = 2, α = 1 is suggested.
Again, these has so much in common with C * that we need the same variations.
In other words, we need to do 3IC − p (with minus and projection) and 2IC + i (with internal perturbation and plus), paralleling C * − p and C * + i (a.k.a. PMI+). Internally Perturbed Matsumoto-Imai can produce this variation [29] : Take v = (v 1 , . . . , v r ) to be an r-tuple of random ane forms in the variables x. Let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a random r-tuple of quadratic functions in v. Let our new Q be dened by
More on Variations and a Summary
where the power operation assumes the vector space to represent a eld. The number of Patarin relations decrease quickly down to 0 as r increases. For every y, we may nd Q −1 (y) by guessing at v(x) = b, nding a candidate x = (y+b) h and checking the initial assumption that v(x) = b. Since we repeat the high going-to-the-h-th-power procedure q r times, we are almost forced to let q = 2 and make r as low as possible.
We observe that there are extraneous solutions just as in HFE. Therefore, we must manufacture some redundancy in the form of a hash segment or checksum. 
PMI (or

Standard Attacks
Solving an MPKC directly as an MQ problem instance is usually futile; the cryptanalyst usually try to attack it as an extended IP problem, or to exploit the algebraic structures to nd extra relations to make the solution easier. We hope to present enough on every approach but avoid too much detail.
Linearization Equations
A Linearization Equation is a relation between the components w and z that always holds for a given set of public keys, such that when substituted with the actual values of z we get an ane (linear) relation between the w i 's. Each one eectively eliminates one variable from the system.
The prime example is the direct attack against C * found by Jacques Patarin.
As mentioned in Sec. 4 
We nd the following bilinear relations
After we substitute w = M −1
S (x − c S ) and z = M T y + c T we get (as found by
Patarin [81] ) for this family of cryptosystem, due to the properties of the map Q, the cipher satises n equations of the following form: In similar systems like 3IC (Sec. 4.8) , for example, Linearization Equations are also present in large numbers as in
In most cases including 3IC and C * , either there are not enough linearization relations or some relations will become redundant after the substitution of the z j , linearizations equations does not actually nd all the w i , but it narrows down the search space by enough that we are able to nd w i easily.
Unlocking via Bilinear Relations and Others Normally, the number of linearization equations has to be high enough such that the remaining variables can be guessed by brute force. It is shown in [37, 38] that even when the number of linearization equations is not so large, their existence can lead to defeat.
Ding and Schmidt noted that the low-rank central polynomials often rank 2 in currently existing implementation schemes for the TTM cryptosystem makes it possible to extend the linearization method by Patarin [81] to attack all current TTM implementation schemes (cf. Sec. 5.1). For the Ding-Schmidt attack, the number of linearization equations is not that high, but the lock polynomial that defends a TTM instance against a simple rank attack is eliminated.
HOLEs (Higher-Order Linearization Equations) The discerning reader can gure out immediately that the linearization relation does not actually need to be linear in z, only in w. A Higher-Order Linearization Equation (HOLE) is a linearization relation that is higher degree in the components of z. In particular, a SOLE (second order linearization equation) would look like
It is natural for the reader to think that this shouldn't happen very often, and it doesn't. However, the possibility that we can use such relations restricts our options when designing systems, as witness the trap that befell MFE.
Let the associated matrix of a square matrix M (replace each entry with the cofactor of that position) be M
where 1 x is the identity matrix. With the same notations as Sec. 4 .7, we set
There are many ways to write down other equations that are homogeneous of degree two in the Y i 's and linear in the X i 's, but [101] showed some will lead to redundant equations. A set sure to lead to independent linear relations is
That's at least 8k linear dependencies out of 12k variables. A cryptanalyst's task has gotten much easier. [101] used another trick the fact that squaring is linear in a char-2 eld to get it down to 2k remaining variables at most and concluded that solving for the remainder is easy. The existence of linearization relations at a higher degree when the designers certainly were trying their best to avoid such shows multivariate encryption schemes design in the triangular style to be full of potholes and very dicult without a higher algebraic breakthrough.
Lazard-Faugère System Solvers
To mount a direct attack, we try to solve the m equations P(w) = z in the n variables w 1 , . . . w n . If m ≥ n, we are (over-)determined, which is good. If m < n, we are underdetermined. For most cases we can't do much more than to guess at m − n variables randomly and continue with m = n [20] .
Today, the diculty of solving generic or randomly chosen systems of nonlinear equations is generally conceded. However, it is hard to quantify exactly how non-generic a system is. Furthermore, many techniques of algebraic cryptanalysis requires system-solving methods at the end for more or less generic systems. So we must handle many instances of the MQ problem, where we want to solve the system p 1 = p 2 = · · · = p m = 0, where each p i is a quadratic polynomial in x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Coecients and variables are in the eld K = F q .
At the moment, the best known methods to solve equations are the descendants of Buchberger's algorithm [12] How to solve likely non-generic systems better is an important topic that we come back to in the last section. For the rest of this paper, we will denote the monomial x 
Proposition 1 ( [5, 107]). The number of monomials is
which reduces to n+D D when q is large. We can then nd
We note that the XL of [24, 25] terminates more or less reliably when T − I ≤ min(D, q − 1), but sparse matrix computation is only possible when T − I ≤ 1 [106] . Further, Lazard-Faugère methods work for equations of any degree [6, 107] 
There is always a certain degree D XL above which Eq. 32 and hence the underlined condition (*) above cannot continue hold if the system has a solution, because the right hand side of Eq. 32 goes nonpositive. This is D XL := min{D :
, called the degree of regularity for XL. If (*) holds for as long as possible (which means for degrees up to D XL ), we say that the system is K-semi-regular or q-semi-regular (cf. [5, 107] ). Diem proves [27] for char 0 elds, and conjectures for all K that (i) a generic system (no algebraic relationship betweem the coecients) is K-semi-regular and (ii) if (p i ) i=1···m are not K-semi-regular, I can only decrease from the Eq. 32 prediction. Most experts seem to believe the conjecture [27] that a random system behaves like a generic system with probability close to 1.
XL is the degree of the lowest term with a non-
We (33) where t is the average number of terms in an equation.
Gröbner Bases and F 4 /F 5 XL2 [25] is a tweak of XL as follows: Tag each equation with its maximal degree. Run an elimination on the system with monomials in degree-lex. In the remaining (row echelon form) system, multiply by each variable x 1 , x 2 · · · all remaining equations with the maximum tagged degree and eliminate again. When we cannot eliminate all remaining monomials of the maximum degree, increment the operating degree and reallocate more memory.
XL+XL2 can be considered a primitive or inferior matrix form of F 4 or F 5 [3] . F 4 inserts elimination between expansion stages, which compresses the number of rows that needs to be handled. F 5 is a further renement of F 4 .
The set of equations is actually generated one by one (or the matrix row by row). In the process, an algebraic criterion is used to determine, ahead of an elimination process, whether a row will be reduced to zero or not and only the meaningful rows are retained. A complication resulting from the tagging is that the elimination must be done in a strictly ordered way. This corresponds in the matrix form to no row exchanges in a Gaussian. There are two separate degrees in 
both F 4 -F 5 will terminate. Note that by specializing to a large eld, we nd
If we compare this formula with Cor. 1, we see that the only dierence is a substitution of n for n + 1. In other words, we are eectively running with one fewer variable in the large eld case. This explains why F 4 -F 5 can be much faster than XL. However, the savings is smaller over small elds like F 2 , and even for large elds, removing one variable may not be enough of a savings, because the systems that we aim to solve will spawn millions of monomials (variables).
Eliminating in the usual way means that we will run out of memory before time.
Proposition 5. F 4 /F 5 runs in (ω := the order of matrix multiplications)
C XL ∝ c ω T ω multiplications. (35) According to the description we received from the MAGMA project and Dr. Faugère, even though memory management is very critical, elimination is still relatively straightforward in current implementations of F 4 -F 5 , and in the process we see reasonably dense matrices, not extremely sparse ones. All said, F 4 -F 5 are still the most sophisticated general system-solving algorithms today. The famous complete solution of HFE challenge 1 is a run of F 5 , specialized and optimized for F 2 , which took 4 days on a 4-CPU Alpha workstation. While the HFE challenge 1 was an instance with a particularly low rank (4), it was usually argued that it should always break HFE for practical r [60] . Recently, it is disputed [41] for odd char K. We await more developments.
Dierential Attacks
Structural attack on MPKC are of two related types:
Invariants: invariants (mostly, subspaces) that can be guessed.
Symmetries: transformations that leave certain quantities unchanged and hence can be computed by a system of equations.
Of course, these two are related, given that invariants are dened according to symmetry. Previous designers sometimes neglected the importance of symmetry.
In this section we present the symmetry or invariants used in the new dierential attacks on the C * family of cryptosystems as exemplied by the Dierential Attacks, from the school of Stern at the Ècole Normale Superieur.
Attacking Internal Perturbations The cryptanalysis of PMI was a novelty for a technique usually associated with symmetric key cryptography, since PMI was a PKC. We use the idea that for a randomly chosen b, the probability is q −r that it lies in the kernel K of the linear part of v. When that happens,
can bypass the protection of the perturbation, nd our bilinear relations and accomplish the cryptanalysis.
In [54] , Fouque, Granboulan and Stern built a one-sided distinguisher using a test on the kernel of the polar form or symmetric dierence DP(w,
and t(b) = 0 otherwise. If b ∈ K, then t(b) = 1 with probability one, otherwise it is less than one. In fact if gcd(n, α) > 1, it is is an almost perfect distinguisher.
If not, we can employ two other tricks. In the more important of the two, we observe K is a vector space, so Pr(t(b + b ) = 0|t(b ) = 0) will be relatively high if b ∈ K and relatively low otherwise. We omit the gory details and refer the reader to [54] for the complete dierential cryptanalysis.
This brilliantly executes a powerful attack. But there is apparently a surprisingly simple defense dating back to [85] (which introduced SFLASH). By using the plus (+) variant, i.e., appending a random quadratics to P, enough false positives are generated to overwhelm the distinguishing test of [54] . The extra equations also serve as a distinguisher when there are extraneous solutions.
Again, we do not include all the details. Basically, the more plus equations, the less discriminating power of the abovementioned test. Based on empirical results of Ding and Gower [33] , when r = 6, a = 12 should be sucient, and a = 14 would be a rather conservative estimate for the amount of plus needed to mask the PMI structure.
The Skew Symmetric Transformation The symmetry found by Stern etc.
can be explained by considering the case of C * cryptosystem. We recollect that the symmetric dierential of any function G, dened formally just like in Eq. 36:
is bilinear and symmetric in its variables a and x. In the rst version of this attack [47] , we look at the the dierential of the public map P, and look for so-called skew-symmetric maps with respect to this bilinear function, namely, the linear maps M such that DP(c, M (w)) + DP(M (c), w) = 0
The reason that this works is that the central map Q and the public key, which encapsulates the vital information in the central map, unfortunately has very strong symmetry in the sense that all the dierentials from these maps share some common nontrivial skew-symmetric map
As pointed out in [47] , the maps M skew-symmetric with respect to this DQ(a, x) are precisely those induced from the multiplication by some element ζ satisfying the condition ζ
Clearly this skew-symmetry will hold if we translate it into w-space. Further it can be seen that the skew-symmetry continues to hold even when we discard some components of P. In terms of the public key, this means that if we write
and try to solve M T H i + H i M = 0 for all i = 1 · · · m simultaneously, we should nd just k-multiples of the identity if n and α are coprime, and a d-dimensional subspace in the space of linear maps if d = gcd(n, α) > 1.
For a randomly chosen map G, it should be expected that only trivial solutions M = u1 n , where u ∈ K, will satisfy this condition. This means that there is a very strong condition on C * − cryptosystems. This symmetry can be utilized to break C * − systems for which d = gcd(n, α) > 1.
The Multiplicative Symmetry We call the second symmetry the multiplicative symmetry, which again comes from the dierential DP(c, w). Let ζ be an element in the big eld L. Then we have
This is also a very strong symmetry, namely it implies that if
is the linear map in K n corresponding to multiplication by ζ, then
I.e., the space spanned by the quadratic polynomials from the central map is invariant under the skew-symmetric action as dened above.
Clearly the public key of C * − inherits some of that symmetry. Now not every skew-symmetric action by a matrix M ζ that corresponds to an L-multiplication that result in M T ζ H i + H i M ζ being in the span of the public-key dierential matrices, because S := span{H i : i = 1 · · · n − r} as compared to span{H i : i = 1 · · · n} is missing r of the basis matrices. However, as the authors of [46] argued heuristically and backed up with empirical evidence, if we just pick the rst three M T ζ H i + H i M ζ matrices, or any three random linear combinations of
and demand that they fall in S, then 1. there is a good chance to nd a nontrivial M ζ satisfying that requirement; 2. this matrix really correspond to a multiplication by ζ in L; 3. applying the skew-symmetric action of this M ζ to the public-key matrices leads to other matrices in span{H i : i = 1 · · · n} that is not in S.
Why three ? There are n(n − 1)/2 degrees of freedom in the H i , so to form a span of n − r matrices takes n(n − 3)/2 + r linear relations among its components (n − r and not n because if we are attacking C * − , we are missing r components of the public key). There are n 2 degrees of freedom in an n × n matrix U . So, if
we take a random public key, it is always possible to nd a U such that
provided that 3n > 2r. However, if we ask that
there are many more conditions than degrees of freedom, hence it is unlikely to nd a nontrivial solution for truly random H i . Conversely, for a set of public keys from C * , tests [46] shows that it almost surely eventually recovers the missing r equations and break the scheme. The only known attempted defense is [32] .
Rank Attacks
We can consider Rank attacks to cover the UOV attacks (next section). But here we only cover attacks that specically targets high or low rank. Let H i be the symmetric matrix corresponding to the quadratic part of z i (w). 1. Compute the dierential P(w+c)−P(w)−P(c) and take its j-th component (which is bilinear in w and c) as c T H j w. H k is representing the quadratic crossterms in the k-th polynomial of the public key. Note that the H i are symmetric, so if char K = 2, x T H i x = 0. This was not made clear in [58] .
Form an arbitrary linear combination H
and check if the solution setV of the (λ i ) form a subspace dimension m − s. Note: a matrix in K n×n have at most n dierent eigenvalues, so at least 1 − (n/q) of the time it does. 4 . With probability q −s we have found a small subspace representing x n . For an UOV construction, we have found V corresponding to constant x 1 · · · x v u .
As each trial run consists of running an elimination and some testing, we can realistically do this with ∼ sn 2 + An upper bound is mn 2 +
The above formulation of the high rank attack works for plus-modied Triangular systems; it is also easier to understand than the [18] formulation. Against UOV, we might possibly do even better on this attack with dierentials [45] .
MinRank Attack We rst describe the Goubin-Courtois version.
Algorithm 2 [58] Let r be the smallest rank in linear combinations of central equations, which without loss of generality we take to be the rst central equation Set P w 1 = · · · = P w k = 0 and solve for λ i via Gaussian elimination. If uniquely solvable P is likely the quadratic part of y 1 , the rst central equation. 3 . Assume the matrix corresponding to y 1 has the minrank of r, then its kernel (the inverse image H −1 1 (0)) has dimension n − r, hence when we guess at (w 1 , . . . , w k ) randomly, they have a probability of at least q −kr to be all in H −1 1 (0). This P is the quadratic portion of y 1 and the coecients λ i the row of M −1 T (up to a factor).
Yang and Chen have extended the eectiveness of this attack [108] . Such that if c mostly distinct kernels have the same r, we can accomplish our task in 1/c the time. In an exaggerated example, against UOV [9, 45] That honor belongs rather to a rank-based attack. Kipnis and Shamir suggested [66] the idea rst. The attack proceeds by moving the problem back to the extension eld, where all the underlying structure can be seen. This is a very natural approach if we intend to exploit the design structure of HFE in the attack. To put it simply: the minimum rank of linear combinations of the H i should be exactly r (as in Sec. 4.3) . This is the MinRank problem [13] and is in general exponential, but can be easier if r is small.
Kipnis and Shamir later suggested to take an linear combination of the H i and take all (r + 1) × (r + 1) submatrices to have determinant zero. This clearly leads to a huge assortment of equations. To solve this system, they introduce an idea which they call relinearization, which led to the well-known XL paper [24] . It has been argued that using a Lazard-Faugère solver on this system of equations is eective [23] and equally eective as the direct attack. Sec. 5 .2 has more on equation-solving.
Distilling Oil from Vinegar and Other Attacks on UOV
To a forge a signature for a UOV scheme as in Sec. 4.4 , one needs to solve the equation P(w) = y. When o = v as with the original Oil-and-Vinegar, this turned out to be fairly easy due to the attack by Kipnis and Shamir [65] .
The basic idea here is that one treats each component y i = p i (w) of the public key P as a bilinear form. Equivalently, take their associated symmetric matrices via the symmetric dierential as follows:
A basic fact of OV: each matrix M i (cf. Eq. 13 ) is in the rough form form of * * * 0 but not the matrices H i . This reduces a cryptanalysis to the algebraic problem of nding a basis change for a set of bilinear forms into a common form.
The problem is interesting enough that we will sketch you one solution. Re- 
Hence, we have M −1 Let this essential part of M S to be recreated be P . I.e., the linear transformation w → x = P w create all zeroes on the lower right. We can decompose this P into a product of P := P v+1 P v+2 · · · P n , where each matrix look like
Indeed, the multiplication is actually commutative among the various P i 's. Let us then start with the dierential matrices H i and simultaneously transform them to make their lower-right corner a square of 0's using exactly such P i 's. 
2. Let all coecients of (w n ) 2 be zero and solve for the λ i . We may use any method such as F 4 /F 5 or FXL. There will be m equations in v unknowns. 3 . Repeat the process to nd P n−1 . Now we set w i := w i −λ i w n−1 for i = 1 · · · v, and set every (w n−1 ) 2 and w n w n−1 term to zero (i.e., more equations in the system) after making the substitution. This time it should be faster since we solve 2m equations in v unknowns. 4 . Continue in this fashion for P n−2 , . . . , P v+1 (easier, even more equations).
In the state-of-the-art system-solving today, we can expect the complexity to be determined in solving the initial system. Hence, if v < m, solving m equations in v variables will be easier than m equations in n equations.
Proposition 6. The Reconciliation Attack fails with probability ≈ 1 q−1 .
Proof (Sketch). Provided that lower-right o × o submatrix of M S is non-singular, we can see that the construction of P n will eliminate the quadratic term in the last variable. P n−1 will eliminate all quadratic terms in the last two variables, and so on, and each sequential construction will not disturb the structure built by the prior transformations. The number of nonsingular k × k matrices in over
, because the rst row has 1 possibility to be zero, the second row q possibilities to be a multiple of the rst, the third row q 2 possibilities to be dependent on the rst two, etc., so the chance that the above attack works is roughly 
I.e., the last o equations looks like Eq. 19 , but the initial m − o equations only have non-zero entries in the upperleft submatrix. The attack below exploits this.
Actually it applies to all nal schemes with a nal UOV booster stage, since we do not use in the attack the property that the rst m − o usually are UOV matrices themselves, i.e., has a block of zeros on the lower right.
At this point, we should no longer consider T as the identity. Let us think about what the matrix M T does in Rainbow. At the moment that we distill the P n portion out, m − o of the new M i 's should show a zero last column. However we don't; M T mixes the M i 's together so that they in fact don't we will see most of the time only the lower right entry as zero. But if we take any o + 1 of those last columns, there will be a non-trivial linear dependency. We can verify that by setting one of those columns as the linear combination as the other o, 
Find m equations by setting all coecients of (w n ) 2 to be zero; there are v variables in the λ i 's. 3 . Set all cross-terms involving w n in z 1 − σ
o z m to be zero and nd n − 1 more equations. Note that (w n ) 2 terms are assumed gone already, so we can no longer get a useful equation. 4 . Solve m + n − 1 quadratic equations in o + v = n unknowns. We may use any method (e.g., F 4 or XL). 
5.
Repeat the process to nd P n−1 . Now set w i := w i − λ i w n−1 for i = 1 · · · v, and set every (w n−1 ) 2 and w n w n−1 term to zero after making the substitu-
o z m to have a zero secondto-last column. This time there are 2m + n − 2 equations in n unknowns. 6 . Continue similarly to nd P n−2 , . . . , P v+1 (now easier with more equations).
To repeat, the Alg. 4 attack works for all constructions with a UOV nal stage, including all Rainbow and TTS constructions. That explains why the current proposed parameters of Rainbow [45] looks like those in Sec. 3.1. 6 The Future
In the last ten years, MPKCs have seen very active and fast developments, producing many interesting new ideas, tools and constructions in both theory and its applications. Due to the consideration of quantum computer threat and the potential of its applications in ubiquitous computing devices, we foresee that the research in MPKCs will move on to the next level in the next decade. Here, we would like present some of our thoughts on the future of the research in multivariate public key cryptography.
Construction of MPKCs
The real breakthrough of MPKCs should be attributed to the work by Matsumoto and Imai in 1988 [70] , a fundamental catalyst. The new idea of Matsumoto and Imai should be called the Big Field construction, where we build rst a map in a degree n extension eld (Big Field) L over a small nite eld K, then move it down to a vector space over the small nite eld with the identication map φ : L −→ K n , the standard K-linear isomorphism between L and K n .
Great eorts are still being devoted to developing MPKCs using this idea [101] , [43] , [36] and [55] . This is also the idea behind the new Zhuang-Zi algo- One idea is to do something like in [95] , where a cryptosystem is built with a very small number of variables (5) but with a higher degree (4) over a much bigger base eld (32 bits). In other words, we can try high degree constructions with fewer variables but over a much bigger eld. In general, any new idea for how to reduce the public key size or in how to manage it in practical applications would be really appreciated.
A second idea is that of using sparse polynomials constructions. The rst explicit usage of such constructions should be attributed to the works of Yang and
Chen [16] . But some of the early such constructions were broken exactly because of the usage of sparse polynomials [42] , which brought unexpected weakness to the system. However, we believe that the idea of using sparse polynomials is an excellent idea, especially from the point view of practical applications. From the theoretical point of view, one critical question that needs to be addressed carefully is that of whether or not the use of specic sparse polynomials has any substantial impact on the security of the given cryptosystem. The answer to this problem will help us to establish the principles for how we should choose sparse polynomials that do not aect the security of the given cryptosystem. An unexpected consequence of answering this problem is that it might also shed some light on the problem mentioned above about reducing the size of the public key.
Attack on MPKCs and Provable Security
Several major methods have been developed to attack the MPKCs. They can be roughly grouped into the following two categories.
Structure-based These attacks rely solely on the specic structures of the corresponding MPKC. Here, we may use several methods, for example, the rank attack, the invariant subspace attack, the dierential attack, the extension eld structure attack, the low degree inverse, and others.
General Attack This attack uses the general method of solving a set of multivariate polynomial equations, for example using the Gröbner basis method, including the Buchberger algorithm, its improvements (such as F 4
and F 5 ), the XL algorithm, and the new Zhuang-Zi algorithm.
Of course, we may also combine both methods to attack a specic MPKC.
It is clear that for a given multivariate cryptosystem, we should rst try the general attack and then we may then look for methods that use the weaknesses of the underlying structure.
Though a lot of work has been done in analyzing the eciency of dierent attacks, we still do not fully understand the full potential or the limitations of some of the attack algorithms, such as the MinRank algorithm, Gröbner basis algorithms, the XL algorithm, and the new Zhuang-Zi algorithm. For example, we still know very little about how these general attacks will work on the internal perturbation type systems such as PMI+ [33, 35] , though we do have some experimental data to give us some ideas about how things work. Another interesting question is to nd out exactly why and how the improved Gröbner basis algorithms like F 4 and F 5 work on HFE and its simple variants with low parameter D [49, 50] . The question is why the hidden structure of HFE can be discovered by these algorithms.
Much work is still needed to understand both the theory and practice of how eciently general attack algorithms work and how to implement them eciently.
From the theoretical point of view, to answer these problems, the foundation again lies in modern algebraic geometry as in [27] . One critical step would be to prove the maximum rank conjecture pointed in [27] , which is currently the theoretical basis used to estimate the complexity of the XL algorithm and the F 4 and F 5 algorithms for example. Another interesting problem is to mathematically prove some fo the commonly used complexity estimate formulas in [106] .
One more important problem we would like to emphasize is the ecient implementation of general algorithms. Even for the same algorithm, the eciency of various implementations can be substantially dierent. For example, one critical problem in implementing F 4 or F 5 , or the XL type algorithms, is that the programs tend to use a large amount of memory for any nontrivial problem. Often the computation fails not because of time constraints but because the program runs out of memory. Therefore, ecient implementations of these algorithms with good memory management should be studied and tested carefully.
Chen, Yang, and Chen [110] developed a new XL implementation with a Wiedemann solver that is probably as close to optimal as might be possible.
They showed that in a few cases the simple FXL algorithm can even outperform the more sophisticated F 4 and F 5 algorithms. More new ideas of improving the algorithms, such as using the concept of mutant [30, 31] , are also being developed.
In general, any new idea or technique in implementing these algorithms eciently could have very serious practical implications.
In order to convince industry to actually use MPKCs in practical applications, the rst and the most important problem is the concern of security.
Industry must be convinced that MPKCs are indeed secure. A good answer to this problem is to prove that a given MPKC is indeed secure with some reasonable theoretical assumptions; that is, we need to solve the problem of provable security of MPKCs. From this point of view, the dierent approaches taken in attacking MPKCs present a very serious problem in terms of provable security. Many people have spent a considerable amount of time thinking about this problem, but there are still no substantial results in this area. One possible approach should be from the point view of algebraic geometry; that is, we need to study further all the dierent attacks and somehow put them into one theoretical framework using some (maybe new) abstract notion. This would allow us to formulate some reasonable theoretical assumptions, which is the foundation of any type of provable security. This is likely a very hard problem.
Practical Applications
Currently, a very popular notion in the computing world is the phrase ubiquitous computing. This phrase describes a world where computing in some form is virtually everywhere, usually in the form of some small computing device such as RFID, wireless sensors, PDA, and others. Some of these devices often have very limited computing power, batteries, memory capacity, and communication capacity. Still, because of its ever growing importance in our daily lives, the security of such a system will become an increasingly important concern. It is clear that public key cryptosystems like RSA cannot be used in these settings due to the complexity of the computations.
In some way, MPKCs may provide an alternative in this area. In particular, there are many alternative multivariate signature schemes such as Rainbow, TTS and TRMC. Recently [4, 111] it is shown that systems like TTS and Rainbow have great potential for application in small computing devices. Due to its high eciency, a very important direction in application of MPKCs is to seek new applications where the classical public key cryptosystems like RSA cannot work satisfactorily. This will also likely be the area where MPKCs will nd a real impact in practical applications.
Broad Connections
As MPKCs develops, it starts to interact more and more with other topics, one example is the algebraic attacks. Algebraic attacks are a very popular research topic in attacking symmetric block ciphers like AES [26] and stream ciphers [2] and analyzing hash functions [94] . We would like to point out that the origin of such an idea is actually from MPKCs, and in particular Patarin's linearization equation attack method. From recent developments we see that there is a trend that the research of MPKCs will interact very closely with that in symmetric ciphers and stream ciphers. We believe some of the new ideas we have seen in
MPKCs will have much more broad applications in the area of algebraic attacks. The idea of multivariate construction was also applied to the symmetric constructions. Recently, new methods had been proposed to build secure hash functions using random quadratic maps [44] [10]. These constructions are very simple and therefore easy to study. They may also have very good property in terms of provable security. Similar ideas may have further applications in desigining stream ciphers and block ciphers. We foresee that the theory of functions on a space over a nite eld (multivariate functions) will play an increasingly important role in the unication of the research in all these related areas.
It is evident that the research in MPKCs has already presented new mathematical challenges that demand new mathematical tools and ideas. In the future, we expect to see a mutually benecial interaction between MPKCs and algebraic geometry to grow rapidly. We further believe that MPKCs will provide excellent motivation and critical problems in the development of the theory of functions over nite elds. There is no doubt that the area of MPKC will welcome the new mathematical tools and insights that will be critical for its future development.
